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COMMENTS
whereby the landlord would not be unduly burdened nor the
lessee placed at the mercy of his lessor. The court can achieve
this by considering the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct,
the nature of the repair, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
disqualified himself by his own misconduct-in other words, by
the operation of ordinary principles of negligence. To a certain
extent this has been accomplished in Louisiana, not on the simple
framework of negligence, however, but by the interpretations
placed upon the various codal articles by the court.
JOHN C. MORRIS, JR.
HAZARDOUS BUSINESSES AND EMPLOYMENTS UNDER
THE LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Today forty-seven of the forty-eight states have workmen's
compensation acts, Mississippi being the only exception. Such
legislation also exists in the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico., Although all workmen's compensation acts seek
to achieve the same result, that is, shifting the basis of liability
for industrial injury from the concept of fault to the more hu-
manitarian premise of industrial responsibility regardless of
fault, the various federal, state, and territorial acts differ widely
in scope and detail of coverage. In this respect the topic of hazar-
dous employments is illustrative. The compensation acts of some
eleven states apply only to hazardous or extra-hazardous em-
ployment.2 The purpose of this type of act is to protect workmen
employed in industries which according to custom and experi-
ence are recognized as threatening greater and more constant
danger of physical injury to their employees than that ordinarily
encountered by the working population at large. The protection
is not against the common uncertainties which affect all walks
of life, but rather against those additional hazards to which a
person is subjected solely on account of the nature of his em-
1. Horovitz, Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1944) 7.
2. Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 48, § 139; Louisiana: La. Act 20 of
1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391]; Maryland: Md. Ann. Code (Bagby,
1924) Art. 101, § 32; Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFar-
land, 1935) § 2847; New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 216, § 1; New
Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) c. 57, § 902; New York: N.Y. Workmen's
Compensation Law, § 3; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 85, § 2;
Oregon: Ore. Code Ann. (1930) § 49-1810; Washington: Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7674; Wyoming: Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Court-
wright, 1931) § 124-102.
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ployment. Other states have included all occupations within the
purview of their compensation acts without regard to considera-
tions of inherent danger or hazard.
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law 8 applies to
hazardous employments only. 4 The scope of the act is limited to
certain enumerated trades, businesses, and occupations by their
nature inherently dangerous, and to others, unspecified, which
may under certain conditions be deemed hazardous. 5
The employment (trade, business, or occupation of the em-
ployer), rather than the particular duties of the employee, is
generally considered the proper test for determining whether the
injured employee may claim compensation for his injuries.6 Thus
if the business or occupation of the employer is regarded as being
non-hazardous there can be no recovery even though the work-
man may be engaged in an operation which is hazardous, but
which is not a part of the trade, business or occupation of the
employer. On the other hand, a workman employed in a busi-
ness that is hazardous is not entitled to compensation if his duties
are wholly nonhazardous.7
The most troublesome cases appear within that sphere where
businesses are rendered partially hazardous solely because certain
employees perform hazardous or partially hazardous duties. No
particular difficulty is encountered in allowing these employees
to recover when injured while performing the hazardous phase
of their duties. Many problems are presented, however, where
the employee having partially hazardous duties is injured in the
performance of his nonhazardous duties.8
3. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391-4432].
4. Employees of the state, its political subdivisions, and agencies are
placed under the operation of the act by peremptory provision. For these
public employees the occupation need not be hazardous in order to qualify
an injured person for compensation. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1 (1) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4391.1].
5. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391.3]; Shipp v. Bor-
delon, 152 La. 795, 94 So. 399 (1922).
6. Mackey v. Fullerton Naval Stores Co., 4 La. App. 43 (1925); DeLony
v. Lane, 155 So. 476 (La. App. 1934); McAllister v. Peoples Homestead and
Savings Association, 171 So. 130 (La. App. 1936).
7. Gray v. Tremont Lumber Co., 185 So. 314 (La. App. 1938), where a
porter whose duties at a lumber mill were confined to sweeping offices and
who never came into contact with the mill was held not to come under the
act.
8. The principal question was summed up in the recent case of Brown
v. Toler, 19 So.(2d) 680 (La. App. 1944): "We deem it unnecessary in this case
to enter upon a full discussion of the rather unsettled state of our juris-
prudence as to the relative extent of hazardous duties as compared to non-
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The first clearcut case to be decided by our courts involving
such a situation was Byas v. Hotel Bentley, Incorporated. The
plaintiff's husband was employed as a bell-boy in the defendant's
hotel. In addition to the ordinary duties of this job he was re-
quired to operate a power-driven elevator, and to go into the
basement of the hotel to operate and adjust certain electrical and
motor-driven equipment. He was killed in the performance of his
baggage handling duties in an altercation with a taxicab driver.
The court held that his dependents were entitled to compensa-
tion despite the fact that the deceased was not performing a
hazardous duty at the time of the accident. It was enough that he
was charged with the performance of certain duties that were
of a hazardous character. This decision is among those most
frequently cited within the field of workmen's compensation. A
consideration of the cases discussing this doctrine will be made
according to the related factual situations.
AUTOMOBILE AND RELATED CASES
The operation of motor vehicles was early held, in Haddad v.
Commercial Truck Company,10 to characterize the business as
hazardous and thus bring the operators under the protection of
the act. The basis of coverage was not the dangers that arise
from traffic hazards such as collision or upset, but rather the
concept of danger arising from association with and operation
of an "engine and other forms of machinery" as provided in the
so-called "catch-all" clause1 of the act. The rule of the Haddad
case has usually been applied to cover an injury sustained by
the regular driver of a motor vehicle as the result of an accident
while operating the vehicle. Thus compensation has been award-
ed to a taxicab driver injured while operating the vehicle in the
course of his employment. 2 The driver of a bakery truck was
similarly covered.13 In these cases it may be said that the opera-
tion of the motor vehicle was a substantial and integral part of
the employer's business.
hazardous duties an employee must be performing in order for him or his
dependents to recover compensation where his employment requires him
to perform both hazardous and nonhazardous work and where he is injured
while performing nonhazardous services."
9. 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1924).
10. 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197, 9 A.L.R. 1380 (1920).
11. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2)(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391.21.
12. Plick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 169 La. 44, 124 So. 140 (1929).
13. Lemmler v. Fabacher, 139 So. 683 (La. App. 1932).
1947/]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
While there is universal agreement that the operator of a
motor vehicle is covered by the act, the courts of appeal have
been unable to agree upon whether a passenger in an automobile
is covered, if his employment is otherwise nonhazardous. The
Orleans circuit extends the act to provide for coverage of pas-
sengers in motor vehicles. 14 The Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit has taken the contrary position and has held that mere
riding in a motor vehicle, having nothing to do with its opera-
tion, is not included within the purview of the act.15 Since the
feature that allows drivers of motor vehicles to come under the
act is "the installation, repair, erection, removal, or operation of
boilers, furnaces, engines, and other forms of machinery,"' 6 the
act does not seem to contemplate coverage of passengers. The
hazards of traffic have not been considered in denoting motor
vehicles as dangerous. 17 Emphasis has always been on operation
of the engine. While the position of the first circuit seems logi-
cally sound, there is support for the holdings of the other courts
of appeal under the liberal interpretation given the act. The su-
preme court has not yet indicated a choice between these two
views.
A related problem is that of the employee who neither drives
nor rides in a motor vehicle but works in close proximity to it,
that being the only connection his duties have with any feature
of the employer's business that could be considered hazardous.
A filling station attendant was deemed to be engaged in a hazar-
dous occupation because of his proximity to and close association
with motor vehicles. 8 In Richardson v. Crescent Forwarding and
Transportation Company' an employee injured while loading a
truck was allowed compensation because it was necessary for
him to work around the engine, it being said that whether or not
the employee operated the machine was of no importance. A
workman engaged in stacking cane preparatory to its being
loaded on trucks was held to have been engaged in a hazardous
undertaking although he neither drove nor rode on the cane
14. Comeaux v. South Coast Corp., 175 So. 177 (La. App. 1937); Crews
v. Levitan Smart Shops, 171 So. 608 (La. App. 1937).
15. Tregre v. Kratzer, 148 So. 271 (La. App. 1933); Lewis v. A. Moresi
Co., Ltd., 196 So. 70 (La. App. 1940).
16. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391.2]. Italics sup-
plied.
17. Horton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 200 So. 44 (La. App. 1941)
(injured on bicycle).
18. Youngblood v. Colfax Motor Co., 125 So. 883 (La. App. 1930).
19. 135 So. 688 (La. App. 1931).
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trucks. 20 In Hayes v. Barras ' the plaintiff, who was employed
temporarily to assist in loading the defendant's truck with office
equipment which the latter had contracted to move, was injured
when he stumbled while carrying a piece of furniture down the
stairs of the building. The plaintiff was awarded compensation
although he was not employed to operate or ride the truck. In
the recent case of Ryland v. R. & P. Construction Company2"
the situation involved an employee who worked as a night watch-
man keeping a lookout over his employer's machinery which
was not operated and not otherwise attended during the night.
While about his duties as night watchman the plaintiff was seiz-
ed with an epileptic fit and fell unconscious into a fire which he
had built to warm himself. The employer resisted the claim for
compensation on the ground that the plaintiff never came in
contact with any of the machinery while it was being operated.
The court awarded compensation, saying that the fact that the
plaintiff was around the machinery at all was enough to make
his duties hazardous.
Cases from the first circuit are to be found which do not
agree with the ones above noted. It was held in Allen v. Yantis
23
that an employee injured while loading a truck could not recover
compensation on the basis of close proximity to the motor ve-
hicle. Richardson v. Crescent Forwarding and Transportation
Company,'2 4 mentioned above, was not approved. In Goodman v.
National Casualty Company 5 the plaintiff sought to base his
recovery on the ground that his employer used trucks in his
business, but the court found that the employee performed no
duties connected with the trucks, although he worked near them
on occasion. Recovery was not allowed.
Although there are minor features on which some of these
cases may be distinguished, in the main they are the result of
basically different interpretations of the act.
Since the decision in the Haddad case there have been many
extensions of the rule therein expressed. In Crews v. Levitan
Smart Shops26 the plaintiff employee was employed by a retail
20. Robichaux v. Realty Operators, 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940).
21. 6 So.(2d) 66 (La. App. 1941).
22. 19 So.(2d) 349 (La. App. 1944).
23. 196 So. 530 (La. App. 1940).
24. 135 So. 688 (La. App. 1931).
25. 15 So.(2d) 173 (La. App. 1943).
26. 171 So. 608 (La. App. 1937).
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clothing store as a traveling solicitor. Her duties consisted of
visiting homes in and around the neighborhood of the store, tak-
ing orders on the club plan. The defendant furnished an auto-
mobile and driver to carry the solicitors from house to house,
and it was while riding in this automobile that the plaintiff was
injured. Her demand in tort was rejected by the court and it was
decided that she should have claimed workmen's compensation
instead of damages. The fact that the defendant's business of
operating a clothing store is not generally hazardous was held
to be of no importance since in conjunction with the store he
operated a gasoline engine with which the plaintiff was required
to be in frequent contact.
Three years after the Crews case the supreme court decided
the case of Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Company.27 Here
an attempt was made by the plaintiff to combine the rule of the
Byas case (that an employee engaged in duties which are only
partially hazardous may recover compensation for injury wheth-
er received in the nonhazardous or hazardous phase of his duties)
with that of the Crews case to bring herself under the act. The
plaintiff was the manager of a movie theatre. Her principal duties
consisted of selling tickets and supervising the showing of films.
Occasionally she was driven by her husband in her own auto-
mobile to inspect billboards or to pick up delayed film in a
neighboring city. The plaintiff was injured, however, when she
fell off a stool while selling tickets at the theater. She showed
that she used an automobile from time to time in her business
and invoked the rule of the Byas case in making her demand for
compensation. Her demands were recognized in both the district
court and in the court of appeal, both feeling that this was but
the logical extension of the Crews case under the Byas doctrine.
The supreme court, however, reversed the court of appeal's
decision and rejected the plaintiff's demands. It was said that
the plaintiff's occasional use of her automobile was so remotely
connected with her employer's business that the effect of holding
her occupation hazardous would be to place almost every occu-
pation within the hazardous category. The facts of the Byas case
were said to be the uttermost extent to which that doctrine
should be applied. It was felt that such application to the Brown-
field case would be carrying the doctrine beyond the limits of
reason. Had the plaintiff been injured while being driven in her
27. 196 La 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
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car the supreme court in order to reach the same result would
have been required to repudiate the Crews case and thus would
have placed a definite limitation on the Haddad case. But since
the decision was based on the amount the automobile was used
in relation to the employee's other duties and to the business of
the employer as a whole the Broufield case must be taken as a
definite limitation of the Byas case. The doctrine is thus restrict-
ed to situations where the dangerous feature of the employee's
occupation represents at least a substantial portion of his duties.28
The courts have wedded the Byas doctrine to the rule of the
Haddad case to produce some rather astounding offspring, es-
pecially in those instances where the operation of the motor
vehicle was the only hazardous feature of the employer's other-
wise nonhazardous business. One of the first cases of this type
was Labostrie v. Weber.2 Here the defendant employer con-
ducted a barber shop, and also owned a truck which he used on
occasion to haul furniture on contract, and which was driven by
plaintiff. However, the plaintiff was injured while engaged at
work upon the demolition of a building used by the defendant
to house his truck, preparatory to the erection of a new garage
for it. The building collapsed and the plaintiff was injured. Al-
though the employee was injured while engaged in the demoli-
tion of a building, which occupation is expressly enumerated in
the act as hazardous,30 recovery could not be allowed under that
theory because his employer was not in the business of construc-
tion or demolition of buildings.3 1 Under the Haddad case, how-
ever, it could be held that one who operated motor vehicles in
connection with his business was to that extent engaged in a
hazardous occupation. It was said that so long as the employee
had partially hazardous duties it did not matter that at the time
of his injury he was occupied by duties not directly compensable
under the act. The Byas case was cited. Thus the employer's lia-
bility is made to depend upon the use of a truck in his business.
28. The supreme court granted a rehearing in the Broumfteld case which
failed to materialize because of a compromise between the parties. A more
recent court of appeal case, Franz v. Sun Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 7 So.(2d)
636 (La. App. 1942), has distinguished the Broumfleld case by finding the
act applicable to an employee who Is regularly transported in motor ve-
hicles, even though the injury occurred not In the automobile, but when the
plaintiff stumbled and fell to the ground while alighting from the vehicle
after it had drawn to a full stop.
29. 130 So. 885 (La. App. 1930).
30. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391.2].
31. Delony v. Lane, 155 So. 476 (La. App. 1934); McAllister v. Peoples
Homestead and Savings Ass'n, 171 So. 130 (La. App. 1936).
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A similar situation arose in the case of Hecker v. Betz.3 2 The
plaintiff was a plumber employed by the defendant, an under-
taker or mortician, to do some work on the building where the
employer lived, conducted his business, and housed his trucks
and automobiles. While hammering on a piece of pipe the plain-
tiff was injured by a fragment of steel which glanced from the
pipe into his eye. The employer's defense to the plaintiff's de-
mand for compensation was that the business of undertaking is
not hazardous and does not come within the coverage of the
compensation law. The court agreed that if the business of un-
dertaking was not hazardous and contained no hazardous fea-
tures, there could be no recovery. It was found, though, that be-
cause the defendant operated motor vehicles in his business of
unlertaking, it was, to that extent, engaged in a hazardous busi-
ness. The Haddad and Labostrie cases were cited. Having said
that the business was partially hazardous because of the motor
vehicle feature the court cited the Byas case, saying,
if an employer is engaged in a business which has
both hazardous and nonhazardous features, an employee
whose work brings him into contact with both features is
protected by the compensation laws even if the injury which
forms the basis of the claim for compensation is sustained
while he is performing nonhazardous duties. That conclusion
and the reasoning from which it results are most potent here
and, we feel, make it necessary that we hold that an employer
who is engaged, as Betz, in a business which has two features,
one hazardous and one nonhazardous, and who, in further-
ance of that general business, undertakes construction work
which, in itself, is hazardous, should be held liable in com-
pensation to those employees who are engaged in such hazar-
dous work.""
The court then mentioned that the building was to be used to
house motor vehicles, comparing it with the Labostrie case
again. It seems to overlook the fact that the plaintiff in the pres-
ent case had nothing to do with the operation of the motor ve-
hicles owned by the employer. These motor vehicles were the
only hazardous features of the defendant's business. The court
was careful to point out that it did not hold that any employer
who undertakes to remodel his own business establishment there-
32. 172 So. 816 (La. App. 1934).
33. Id. at 820.
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by renders himself liable in compensation to an employee in-
jured in such work. According to the opinion, all that was held
was that if the building is being remodeled or reconstructed for
use in a business which, at least to some extent, is hazardous,
then those who do such reconstruction work are protected by the
act. Thus it seems that the plaintiff could not have recovered
had there been no automobiles connected with the defendant's
business. Yet he had no connection whatsoever with the auto-
mobiles. The court does not seem to be justified in its use of the
combined Byas-Haddad doctrine here, since it was admitted that
the plaintiff could not recover by virtue of being engaged in
construction or demolition duties because the occupation of his
employer was not the construction business.
Neither the Labostrie case nor the Hecker case can be dis-
tinguished from the case of Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil
Company, Incorporated,3 which decided that an employee en-
gaged in construction work not a part of the business of his em-
ployer was not covered by the act. The rule of the Horrell case
was recognized in both the Labostrie and the Hecker cases, but
the conclusion to which the rule would have led was avoided
in both instances by misapplication of the combined rules of the
Byas and Haddad cases.
CASES INVOLVING FARMERS
Farming is not necessarily a hazardous occupation, 5 but it
may be made hazardous by installation and operation of certain
types of engines and machinery. 6 However, the courts are re-
luctant to designate farming occupations as hazardous. They are
also much less willing to say that a farmer's business is partially
hazardous because of the use of a motor vehicle or other types
of engines than in the class of cases discussed under the preced-
ing heading.
34. 131 So. 709 (La. App. 1930). The plaintiff in the Horrel case was the
employee of an independent contractor and sought to recover damages in
tort. However, the question upon which liability depended was whether or
not a person who is performing hazardous work which is not a part of the
employer's regular business comes within the purview of the act. In this
respect it seems to be immaterial whether the plaintiff is a direct employee
or is employed by an independent contractor. The rule is the same, whether
the employee comes under Section 2(a) or under Section 6 of the act.
App. 1934); Rayburn v. DeMoss, 192 So. 738 (La. App. 1939).
35. Thompson v. J. B. Levert Land Co., 2 La. App. 159 (1929); Bradley
v. Blakely, 154 So. 415 (La. App. 1934); DeLony v. Lane, 155 So. 476 (La.
36. Staples v. Henderson Jersey Farms, Inc., 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938).
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In Rayburn v. DeMoss-7 the plaintiff was injured while do-
ing carpentry work on a small dairy. The dairy owned a truck
and various small items of machinery, but the plaintiff was not
required to operate them, although he was in close proximity to
them at times. Recovery was denied on the ground that the in-
jured workman had performed no service directly or indirectly
connected with any hazardous part of his employer's business.
Unless it be admitted that special concessions are being made to
farmers (and the Workmen's Compensation Law makes none)
this case should largely nullify the effect of the decision in the
Hecker case. The cases appear to be indistinguishable on the
facts.
In Lewis v. Moresi Company, Limited,as it was held that an
employee who was riding on a tractor-pulled wagon when he
was injured was not entitled to compensation because his injury
did not occur in a hazardous occupation or business. The court
rejected the plaintiff's demands on two grounds. First, it was
said that passengers on motor vehicles are not covered by the
act. Second, the plaintiff's contact with the motor vehicle was
rare and not a material part of his duties. This last reason is
similar to the ground used to reject the plaintiff's demands in
the Brownfield case, previously discussed. Thus it would appear
that farm employees injured while engaged in truck loading
operations have been denied recovery"o while non-farm em-
ployees injured while similarly engaged have been awarded
compensation. °
The case of Williams v. Westdale Corporation4' went to the
full extent of holding that a farm hand injured while driving a
tractor could not recover compensation because the business of
farming is not hazardous. The court commented to the effect that
holding farm employees entitled to recover in such cases would
produce disastrous results to farmers. However, it is safe to as-
sume that the Williams case will not stand up under future as-
saults by employees seeking compensation because of Collins v.
Spielman,'2 hereinafter discussed.
37. 194 La. 175, 193 So. 579 (1940).
38. 196 So. 70 (La. App. 1940).
39. Allen v. Yantis, 195 So. 530 (La. App. 1940).
40. Hayes v. Barras, 6 So.(2d) 66 (La. App. 1941).
41. 3 So.(2d) 684 (La. App. 1941).
42. 200 La. 568, 8 So.(2d) 608 (1942).
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Some cases have held that use of motor vehicles, engines,
and machines on the farm is sufficient to transform the farm
into a partially hazardous business. In Robinson v. Atkinson"
the court recognized the fact that farming is not a hazardous
business per se, but that it may be made partially hazardous by
the operation of a gasoline ensilage harvester or hay cutter. It was
further held that it makes no difference that the machinery is not
a permanent feature of the farming operation but has only been
borrowed for the one occasion upon which the employee is in-
jured. Here the employee was injured directly by the machinery,
and there was no occasion for applying the doctrine of the Byas
case.
In Staples v. Henderson Farms, Incorporated," the plaintiff
was injured while driving a truck which belonged to his employ-
er, a highly mechanized dairy, and recovery was allowed. Here
again the employee was injured while operating hazardous ma-
chinery.
Recovery was allowed an injured employee in Robichaux v.
Realty Operators" on the ground that the employee was em-
ployed in the "manufacturing" part of his employer's combina-
tion plantation-sugar factory rather than in the "farming" phase.
The plaintiff was engaged as a cane stacker. His duties consisted
of piling cane preparatory to loading it upon trucks with a motor
operated derrick.
An outstanding recent case, Collins v. Spielman,46 applied
the combined Byas-Haddad doctrine to farming operations. The
plaintiff, a general farm hand, whose duties included the driving
of a tractor during planting season and the driving of a milk
delivery truck at other times was injured while herding his em-
ployer's cows. The court of appeal 47 denied compensation on the
ground that it had never been the intention of the legislature to
extend the provisions of the act to "the small farmer or mer-
chant." The supreme court reversed on the ground that the plain-
tiff was engaged in a partially hazardous occupation because of
his operation of the machinery and appliances used in connec-
tion with the farm. The Byas case was cited as authority for the
rule that recovery may be had whether the employee was en-
43. 198 La. 238, 3 So.(2d) 604 (1941).
44. 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938).
45. 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940).
46. 200 La. 68, 8 So.(2d) 608 (1942).
47. 8 So.(2d) 606 (La. App. 1941).
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gaged in hazardous or nonhazardous duties at the time he was
injured.
The Collins case may be taken as an indication that farmers
are going to be held to the same responsibility as other employ-
ers. The supreme court was emphatic in its reaffirmation of both
the Byas and the Haddad cases.
COMMERCIAL ESTABLISmENTS HAVING SMALL MECHANICAL
APPLIANCES
We have seen how the introduction of a machine or engine
may render hazardous an ordinarily nonhazardous business. Em-
ployees of restaurants and stores have often been able to secure
compensation for injuries by application of this principle, al-
though generally such establishments are not considered hazar-
dous businesses.4"
In Stephens v. Catalano49 compensation was allowed an er-
rand and general utility boy employed by the defendant meat
market. The plaintiff was injured while operating an electrically
driven meat grinder. It was held that to the extent he was re-
quired to use the electric meat grinder the employee's duties
were hazardous.
In the recent case of Storm v. Johnson0 the plaintiff was em-
ployed in a restaurant as counterman and night manager. The
restaurant was equipped with an electrical meat slicer and
grinder which the plaintiff used from time to time in the per-
formance of his regular duties. The plaintiff cut his thumb with
a nonmechanical meat cleaver and was awarded compensation.
The court cited the Byas case and pointed out that the award
was not dependent upon whether the plaintiff was injured while
using the machinery forming the hazardous portion of his job.
Brown v. Toler,51 another recent court of appeal case, sug-
gests a more cautious attitude than the Storm case takes. In this
case the plaintiff was employed in a store containing an electric
meat grinder. He injured himself while opening oysters. His de-
mand for compensation was rejected by the trial court, the de-
48. Adams v. Hicks, 149 So. 242 (La. App. 1933); Atkins v. Holsum Cafe-
teria, 159 So. 758 (1935); Scott v. Dalton Co., 1 So.(2d) 412 (La. App. 1941).
49. 7 So.(2d) 380 (La. App. 1942).
50. 23 So.(2d) 639 (La. App. 1945).
51. 19 So.(2d) 680 (La. App. 1944).
[VOL. VII
COMMENTS
cision being affirmed by the court of appeal. It was found that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that his duties required him to
operate or clean the meat grinder. The court might have rested
the decision on this ground alone. It was pointed out, however,
that the plaintiff did not show that his association with the
grinder was a major and material part of his employment so as
to make it hazardous within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Law. The court approved the Brownfield case as
a salutary indication of a tendency on the part of the supreme
court to modify the hitherto unrestricted application of the rule
of the Byas case.
As previously stated, grocery and department stores have
generally been held to be nonhazardous businesses.52 The case of
Stockstill v. Sears-Roebuck & Company," however, is worth
noting as an extreme application of the Byas case to this type of
business. Here the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in
its refrigerator department. His duties involved arranging the
stock of refrigerators on the floor of his employer's store and in-
stalling them in customers' houses after sale. The employee in-
jured his back while moving refrigerators on the floor of the
store. He was awarded compensation on the ground that he was
required to deal with electrical equipment (plugging the electric
cords into the wall sockets) which was hazardous. Because his
duties were partially hazardous recovery was allowed under the
Byas case.
CONCLUSION
Up to the time of the Brownfield case there had been no
tendency on the part of the courts to limit or restrict the appli-
cation of the rule laid down in the Byas case. Whether the su-
preme court will maintain its decision limiting recovery to cases
where the hazardous features. of the employee's partially hazar-
dous employment constitute a "'substantial" or "material" por-
tion of his whole employment remains to be seen. The fact that
the Brownfield case was compromised pending a rehearing before
the supreme court leaves room for doubt on the issue.
If the trend is away from unrestricted application of !the rule
of the Byas case the result will be the overturning of a large
52. Adams v. Hicks, 149 So. 242 (La. App. 1933); Rester v. Community
Stores, Inc., 169 So. 183 (La. App. 1935).
53. 151 So. 822 (La. App. 1934).
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number of cases. Such a trend would not mean that the amount
of litigation would be lessened. The issue of "substantial" or
"material" relation between total duties and hazardous duties is
particularly nebulous.
Although many of the cases decided under the doctrine of
the Byas and related cases are subject to criticism, a solution
for the problem is not one susceptible of yardstick application.
Each situation must be dealt with individually. These cases with
their intricate fact situations cannot be expected to fall readily
between any set lines of demarcation.
HORACE LANE
